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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARCLE 11 - POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102(a): Indigent litigant in a divorce action has no
constitutional right to assigned counsel.
In a recent 4-3 decision, In re Smiley4 9 the New York Court of
Appeals held that an indigent wife, as plaintiff or defendant in a divorce
action, is not constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel. 0
Further, the Court refused to order retained counsel compensated
from public funds.51 Standing alone, this decision is significant for its
refusal to extend further the rights of indigent civil litigants 2 and its
declaration that CPLR 1102(a), allowing the assignment of an attorney
for a poor person by court order, 3 is discretionary rather than man-
datory54 Considered in light of Menin v. Menin, 5 an earlier decision
by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, Smiley apparently rele-
gates to a highly restricted "privilege"56 that which many contended
was a fundamental right to counsel.57
Menin was akin to Smiley in that it involved petitions by a de-
fendant and potential plaintiffs seeking assignment of uncompensated
counsel in actual and proposed divorce actions. But the Menin court,
in addition to holding that "the Due Process Clause does not require
appointment of counsel,"58 refused to exercise its discretionary au-
49 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 869 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
5O1d. at 437, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
51 Id. at 437, 439, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90, 92.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, Tompkins County, directing the
county to provide counsel and compensation therefor. Smiley v. Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d
785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.). The Appellate Division based its decision
on the lack of judicial authority to direct the expenditure of public funds absent enabling
legislation. Id. at 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 734. Accord, Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716,
350 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
170, 183 (1974) (there is neither "constitutional nor statutory authority" for such an
order).
52 See notes 57, 61-62, 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
53 See note 56 infra.
54 Compare 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1102, commentary at 150 (Supp. 1974) ("counsel
must be furnished") with 2 WKS=&M 1102.01 ("this section changes the former law by
leaving it within the court's discretion whether to assign an attorney"). Smiley confirms
the latter view by holding that "there is no absolute right to assigned counsel; whether
in a particular case counsel shall be assigned lies instead in the discretion of the court."
36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
55 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 48 App. Div. 2d 904, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
5 CPLR 1102(a) creates a "privilege" in favor of a poor person which permits a court
in its discretion to assign him an attorney. See generally 2 WK&M 1102.01.
57 See, e.g., Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right
of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 595, 596-97, 617-24
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Brickman]; Comment, Access to the Civil Courts: The Need
for Continuing Reform, 37 ALBANY L. REv. 135, 144-45, 147-48 & n.92, 153 (1972); Note,
The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUat. L. REy. 1322 (1966).
58 79 Misc. 2d at 287, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
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thority to appoint private attorneys on the basis that such counsel "have
the constitutional right to demand payment or reject the assignment."5 9
Thus, according to Menin, assignment of uncompensated counsel for
an indigent civil60 litigant will be limited to those cases where members
of the bar voluntarily accept court appointment.
The Menin court explicitly recognized that its position fails to con-
form with the virtually unanimous declarations of the New York
courts.61 The Smiley majority, in dictum, restated the rule presented
by these earlier decisions as follows:
Inherent in the courts and historically associated with the duty of
the Bar to provide uncompensated services for the indigent has
been the discretionary power of the courts to assign counsel in a
proper case to represent private indigent litigants. Such counsel
serve without compensation. Statutes codify the inherent power of
the courts .... The obligation of the Bar to respond is expressed
in the Code of Professional Responsibility .... 62
This language would appear to be a rejection by the Court of Appeals
of the Menin proposition. Subsequent dictum in Smiley, however, spe-
cifically referring to Menin, can be interpreted as at least tacitly
approving that decision: "[T]he undue burden which may be placed
on the private Bar by assignments under CPLR 1102, may also become
intolerable and some might say rank as a violation of the constitutional
rights of lawyers .... "3
It is not surprising that this question arose in the context of a
59 Id. at 293, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
60 Criminal matters present a different question since there the defendant's constitu-
tional right to counsel is well established. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Further, in New York the Criminal Procedure
Law provides statutory authority which assures the defendant's right to free counsel.
N.Y. CRiM. PRo. LAW § 210.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1971). This is further supplemented by
article 18-B of the County Law. N.Y. CouNTY LAw art. 18-B (McKinney 1972). More
significantly, the constitutional infirmity found by the Menin court is eliminated by
§ 722-b of the County Law which provides for reasonable compensation to appointed
counsel. Id. § 722-b.
61 "In New York the cases are legion in stating the proposition that the court has
inherent power to assign counsel without compensation .... " 79 Misc. 2d at 291, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 727-28 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Jacox v. Jacox, 43 App. Div. 2d 716, 717,
350 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.) ("counsel must be provided by the Bar
through the personal obligation of its members'); People ex rel. Whedon v. Board of
Supervisors, 192 App. Div. 705, 706, 183 N.Y.S. 438 (3d Dep't 1920) (mem.) ("An attorney
is an officer of the court, and service .... for which no compensation is permitted by
law, is not depriving him of a constitutional right").
62 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
63Id. at 441, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93 (citations omitted). The Court
properly recognized that logically "[t]he horizon does not stop at matrimonial or any
other species of private litigation." Id.
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matrimonial dispute wherein an indigent's right to assigned counsel
would appear to flow naturally from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Boddie v. Connecticut64 and the New York Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Deason v. Deason.6 In Boddie the Supreme Court
struck down filing fees in divorce actions as violative of due process. 66
Deason extended Boddie by requiring that the local governmental unit,
rather than the indigent litigant, pay certain publication costs associ-
ated with the matrimonial action. 67 Since both Courts held that a
contrary result would have had the effect of denying the indigent access
to the courts, many commentators argued that failure to provide coun-
sel also would be an unconstitutional denial of access.68 Even prior to
and quite possibly forming the foundation for these decisions existed
a substantial volume of scholarly commentary forcefully calling for a
total abolition of all financial barriers, including the cost of counsel,
which denied or limited access to the civil courts.69
The dissenters in Smiley were to a great measure in accord with
these views. Judge Jones quoted an earlier Court of Appeals' decision
stating that "the right to be heard would be 'of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'"70 Indicated by way
of footnote but quite significant is the fact that Judge Jones limited
his dissent solely to matrimonial actions.71
04 401 U.S. 371 (1971), discussed in Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts by
Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 AA. U.L. REv. 129, 135-40 (1974); Comment, Boddie and
Beyond: Rights of the Indigent Civil Litigant, 18 CATH. LAW. 67 (1972); The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAiv. L. REV. 3, 18-21, 104-13 (1971).
65 92 N.Y.2d 93, 296 NXE.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973). See generally 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 1102, commentary at 150 (Supp. 1974).
66 401 U.S. at 374-81.
67 32 N.Y.2d at 95, 296 N.E.2d at 230, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 322-23.
68 See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 57, at 603-12, 617-37, 668; Comment, Indigent's
Access to Civil Court, 4 CoLimri. HUMAN PRGHTs L. REv. 267, 295-97 (1972); Note, A First
Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1063-64,
1066-67 (1973).
The general theory is that a layman is not competent or knowledgeable enough in
the law to adequately represent himself. Therefore, where the party lacks sufficient funds
to retain counsel, the state in failing to provide such counsel is imposing a burden
which is functionally equivalent to a denial of access. Cf. text accompanying note 72 infra.
69 See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223 (1970);
Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253
(1968); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLum. L. Rav. 1322 (1966);
Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. LJ. 516 (1968);
Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HAav. L. Rav.
435 (1967); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALm L.J. 545 (1967).
70 36 N.Y.2d at 443-44, 30 N.E2d at 59, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 96 (Jones, J., dissenting),
quoting People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241, 318
N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (1971).
71 Judge Jones stated:
I would distinguish between the right of indigents to be represented by counsel
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In his dissent Judge Fuchsberg took a broader view. He concluded
that the denial of counsel to indigent matrimonial litigants is consti-
tutionally infirm
whenever counsel is essential to the effective exercise of their right
of access to the court. This right should attach whenever the court
finds that indigent parties are incapable of preparing and present-
ing matrimonial actions pro se, including all divorce actions in
which the dissolution is contested or in which property, support
and custody issues cannot readily be resolved through mediation.72
Moreover, he rejected the concept that such constitutional rights are
limited to divorce actions alone, stating that his position "has obvious
implications for other types of civil judicial proceedings"7 s as well.
The Court was, however, unanimous on one point; the majority"
and both dissents75 agreed that the courts lack the power to compel
either the state or local governmental units to provide counsel or the
funds therefor. This issue ostensibly was the central one facing the
Court since the Appellate Division, Third Department, had based its
decision on the inability of the court to direct payment.76 The various
opinions in the Court of Appeals' decision went far beyond the question
of funding, however, in reaching their respective conclusions.
in litigation seeking the dissolution of a marriage and other types of litigation.
In the former, in the language of Boddie, there is a "state monopolization of
the means for dissolving the marriage relationship" .... In other instances re-
course to judicial machinery for dispute settlement, while perhaps useful and
desirable, is not mandated by the State.
36 N.Y.2d at 444 n.1, 330 N.E2d at 59 n.1, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 96 n.1 (Jones, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
72 Id. at 452, 330 N.E2d at 65, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
78 Id., 30 N.E.2d at 65, 869 N.YS.2d at 104. On this point the majority appeared to
agree with Judge Fuchsberg. See note 63 supra.
74 Chief Judge Breitel writing for the majority commented that
the relief must be provided by the Legislature. The fundamental is that the
courts constitute but one branch of government. The absence of appropriated
funds and legislation to raise taxes under our state constitutional system, as in
the rest of the Union, is not a judicially-fillable gap.
Id. at 441-42, 330 N.E2d at 94, 369 N.YS.2d at 94.
75 In his dissent Judge Jones stated that
the determination of how the required legal services shall be made available(and here I agree with the majority) is one ...to be addressed and to be re-
solved by the Legislature .... [which] is . .. the proper source of authorization
for expenditure of funds ....
Id. at 444-45, 330 N.E2d at 60, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Judge Fuchsberg's agreement can also be implied:
It does not necessarily follow from the existence of the right to be provided
with counsel that proper implementation of that right requires directing a county
to pay for counsel. Charging any level of government, where funds have notbeen appropriated by the Legislature, should be regarded as a relatively drastic
step ....
Id. at 452-53, 330 N.E2d at 65, 369 N.Y.S2d at 104 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
76 Smiley v. Smiley, 45 App. Div. 2d 785, 356 N.Y.S.2d 733, 784 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
See note 51 supra.
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Smiley clearly dictates a retreat from the position previously taken
by lower courts that CPLR 1102(a) embodies a public policy virtually
commanding the assignment of counsel where permission to proceed as
a poor person has been granted. 77 The underlying motivation for this
decision not only refusing to extend further the indigent civil litigant's
rights but also limiting rights formerly granted freely may well lie in
concern over the increasing burden on the private bar.
Similarly, the Menin court's decision permitting assigned counsel
to refuse an uncompensated appointment illustrates what is best char-
acterized as a "blacklash" resulting from the expanding right to counsel
of the indigent in both criminal and civil matters.78 This phenomenon
has expressed itself as a slowly developing judicial activism aimed at
the reform of the uncompensated counsel system79 and is not without
77 See Emerson v. Emerson, 33 App. Div. 2d 1022, 308 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.); Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence
County 1973); Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322
N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Suruey, 46 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 355, 368 (1971). See also 7B McKINNEY's CPIR 1102, commentary at 150 (Supp. 1974)
("counsel must be furnished').
78 See generally Brickman, supra note 57; Note, The Right to Counsel: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the United States and Great Britain, 50 NoRE DAum LAW. 117 (1974);
Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972).
79 Including New York under the rule laid down in Menin, there are at least 10
jurisdictions which have to varying degrees recognized the attorneys' right to compensation
for services rendered to indigents. See Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 495,
74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969) (county charged with costs) (relying on public policy in favor of
compensation); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d
405 (1940) (under state constitution, the state has no right to assign counsel without com-
pensation); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850) (under Federal Constitu-
tion, local government must compensate counsel); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky.
1972) (appointment without compensation unconstitutional under federal and state con-
stitutions); Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 227 N.E.2d 486 (1967) (courts
authorized to make payments to criminal defense counsel under a state statute authorizing
courts to use county treasuries to meet court operating expenses); State v. Green, 470
S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971) (court will not compel attorneys to bear alone a burden which the
state has a duty to provide under the state constitution); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217
A.2d 441 (1966) (court has power to order compensation pursuant to its power to regulate
the practice of law); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1974) aff'd on other grounds, 48 App. Div. 2d 904, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d
Dep't 1975) (mem.) (attorneys have a right to reject assignment without compensation
under the federal and state constitutions); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,
447 P.2d 193 (1968) (assignment without compensation in civil actions constitutes involun-
tary servitude under the Federal Constitution); Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison
Terms 8- Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970) (attorney entitled to compensation
for prosecuting an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus according to public
policy as reflected in state statutes which provide compensation in other criminal pro.
ceedings).
It must be noted that the foregoing cases are cited not to demonstrate settled or
even present law in these jurisdictions, but rather to illustrate how courts, when they deem
it necessary or desirable, have justified compensating appointed counsel.
1975]
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scholarly support.80 Such reform is typically established by declaring
uncompensated appointment to be unconstitutional or by ordering
state or local governments to bear the costs.
Attacks on constitutional grounds are generally based on the fifth
or fourteenth amendments. Such attacks postulate that the attorney's
services are to be considered his property, and thus assignment without
compensation results in a constitutionally impermissible "taking."
8
'
Less frequently advanced is the contention that assignment without
compensation constitutes involuntary servitude and is thereby violative
of the thirteenth amendment.82 The above theories, however, represent
the minority view and run against well-established legal thought 8
which justifies the failure to compensate counsel on two grounds: (1)
that the attorney has a duty as an officer of the court to provide gratu-
itous service when the court appoints him; and (2) that the attorney
consents to this obligation as a condition to being licensed.84
Whether focusing on the indigent's right to counsel or the attor-
ney's right to compensation or both, there appears to be sufficient au-
thority to justify any result reached. It is submitted that the factors con-
trolling the widely disparate majority and dissenting opinions in Smiley
and Menin were public policy concern over resolution of pressing social
problems combined with either judicial activism or restraint in terms
of usurping the legislative function. Since the New York courts obvi-
ously lack the power to provide funds to compensate assigned counsel,
ultimate reform of the present patchwork system8 5 must rest With the
legislature.
The Smiley majority, by resisting the trend towards increasing
the rights of indigents, has in effect given the legislature more time to
act, but failed to mandate such action. Judge Jones' dissent would re-
80 See, e.g., Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?,
42 Miss. L.J. 32 (1971); Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A
Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Uncom-
pensated Counsel].
81 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Ky. 1972); Menin v. Menin, 79
Misc. 2d 285, 292-93, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 729-30 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 48 App. Div. 2d 904, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); Uncompensated
Counsel, supra note 80, at 713-15 & nn. 24-26.
82 Wfiliams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?, 42 Miss.
LJ. 32 (1971).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1965); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alas. 1966); Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375,
392 S.W.2d 681 (1965).
84 Uncompensated Counsel, supra note 80, at 713. See also cases cited id. nn. 19-21.
85 Counsel is made available with and without compensation from public funds by
statute, voluntary legal aid, charitable organizations, and federally funded programs. In re
Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 330 NY.2d 53, 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91-92 (1975).
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quire an immediate legislative response, but limiting the right to coun-
sel to matrimonial actions"6 would only produce another "patch" in
the already inadequate and disorganized legislative schema.
A true reform would more likely result from a combination of
Judge Fuchsberg's dissent and the Menin decision. If the Court of
Appeals were to declare that attorneys had a constitutional right to
adequate compensation for their services and that indigents in all
proceedings, criminal, civil, and administrative, had a right to be rep-
resented by counsel, the legislature would be forced to develop an
organized, comprehensive program insuring that all litigants - without
regard to financial status - would have their claims effectively pre-
sented. A bold step towards creating true "equal justice under law,"
this solution would enhance the probability of a decision based on the
merits of the claim, rather than on the financial resources of the
claimant.
ARTICLE 12-INFANTS AND INCOMPETENTS
CPLR 1209: Permission for submitting infant's claim to arbitration
may be obtained at any time prior to commencement of arbitration
hearings.
CPLR 1209 provides that when a controversy involves an infant
a court order must be obtained by the infant's representative before
that controversy can be submitted to arbitration.87 The Court of Ap-
peals, in Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Stekardis,88 has allowed an infant's
representative greater flexibility in complying with the provisions of
that statute.
Stekardis involved a motor vehicle accident claim against Aetna,
holder of the liability insurance policy on the Stekardis car.89 Claims
86 See note 71 supra.
87 Section 2365 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly forbade the submission to
arbitration of any controversy involving an infant party. Ch. 178, § 2365, [1880] N.Y. Laws
298. When this section was later incorporated into the CPA, its character as an absolute
prohibition was preserved. Ch. 925, § 1410, [1920] N.Y. Laws 473-74 (renumbered § 1448
by Ch. 199, § 14, [1921] N.Y. Laws 801-02). In 1937, the legislature amended CPA 1448 to
allow the guardian of an infant party to petition the court for permission to submit the
controversy to arbitration. Ch. 341, § 1448, [1937] N.Y. Laws 203. The amended CPA 1448
eventually became what is presently CPLR 1209. Ch. 308, § 1209, [1962] N.Y. Laws 650.
88 34 N.Y.2d 182p 313 N.E.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1974).
89Id. at 184, 313 N.E.2d at 53, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 588. An unidentified truck collided
with an automobile in front of the Stekardis car, causing a piece of furniture to fall from
the truck. In the confusion, the Stekardis car struck another vehicle. On the theory that
the truck had caused the accident, the claimants sought recovery under the "uninsured
motorist" endorsement contained in the Stekardis policy. The New York Insurance Law
mandates that every motor vehicle insurance policy contain such a provision, protecting
the insured in the event he suffers damages as a result of an accident with an uninsured or
unidentified motor vehicle. N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a) (McKinney 1966).
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